'South of the Border, down Mexico way'.... indeed, over to neighbourly Texas
'South of the Border, down Mexico way'.... indeed, over to neighbourly Texas
Thanks Mike.
How about this non-assuming monoplane?
It crashed on it's first flight in 1930. The designers went on to build a twin and then gave up on aeroplanes altogether to focus on cars.
This one is a little off the beaten path. The engine is from the USA but the rest originated elsewhere.
Last gasp-
From a country below the equator and the design team had a connection to the famed MacRobertson race.
Will reveal in the morning if still on the board.
I got this info from a friend. Maybe shed light on the Russian aircraft aNT-25/RDD.
DB-1 (RD-BB,ANT-36)
Even in the draft ANT-25 project, submitted in August 1931, mentioned the possibility of using the aircraft as a long-range bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. The bomb load was determined at 1000 kg. At the beginning of the design of the ANT-25, the Air Force Research Institute set the task to work on the RD-1 in San Jacinto, July 1937 issue of "the possibility of adapting the long-range aircraft as a long-range bomber (for a theoretical range of 3,500 km)."
The idea of an aircraft of this purpose with a long range of flight was born at the turn of the 1920s-1930s. In several developed aviation countries. The leadership of the Air Forces of France and Great Britain set the task of the industry to create a machine that would perform the role of a "long range bomber” capable of inflicting pinpoint strikes on targets are far from their bases. Unlike heavy bombers, such aircraft were supposed to have a much smaller flight weight and bomb load, but a much greater range. In the West, the development of this concept has reached the level of serial production; ie. theVickers "Wellesley" took part in the Second World War used in Africa against the Italians.
The VVS wanted to place airplanes of this class in the Far East, where there were few airfields, and the distances to targets in China, Japan and Korea were great.
Detailed development of the military version of the ANT-35, named RD-VV, ANT-36 or DB-1, was deployed in parallel with the record-breaking aircraft in 1932. In May 1933, TsAGI already determined the main data of the combat vehicle. The flight weight was limited to 7500 kg emptyweight - 3190 kg. The crew, like the ANT-25 version, consisted of three people. Defensive weapons consisted of two 7.62-mm machine guns and an "automatic rifle". Instead of fuel tanks in the middle of the fuselage, there was a bomb-bay with a vertical suspension of ten FAB-100, FAB-50 or KhAB-25 bombs. Gasoline tanks were in the center section, and the tanks in the outer sections were shortened by a meter. As the tanks entered the wing box, it was required to put additional ribs and strengthen the skin. In total, they could take up to 3000 kg of gasoline, but, according to calculations, it was envisaged to take 2340 kg of gasoline and 290 kg of oil.
May 5, 1933 the head of the SUAI P.I. Baranov sent to the People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov wrote a memorandum in which he said: "According to your assignment, TsAGI has worked on the issue of using a record-long aircraft for military purposes." In the same place, the approximate data of the machine were reported: a top speed of 210 km/h, a practical ceiling of about 4000 m and a flight range of 4000 km. In addition to the load variant with ten bombs of 100 kg each, a variant with 400 small incendiary bombs of 1 kg was suggested . About the "automatic gun" in this document nothing was said, only two machine guns with a stock of 1000 rounds.
In parallel with the bomber, a chemical version of the RD was worked out. On April 23, 1933, the Chief of the Military Chemical Administration (VokhIMU) of the RKKA Ya.M. Fishman suggested that the UVVS use the ANT-25 "for the purposes of an air-chemical attack." It was planned to leave 1000-2000 kg of gasoline, and the remaining tanks to accommodate 4000-5000 kg of liquid chemical agents under their premises. Hatches were cut in the wings for their pouring out. "From such an adaptation of the plane RD can be expected a great effect ...", - wrote Fishman. This proposal aroused interest in the VVS Chief of Staff V.V. Hripina. The task for the chemical version of the aircraft was issued by the Air Force Research Institute, TsAGI initially did not pursue them. The first estimates of this modification were carried out in May 1933. The flight weight was to be the same as that of the bomber, 7,500 kg. At the same time, the actual amount of solution delivered to the target did not exceed 1000 kg. Of these, the poisonous substance itself was 800 kg, and the rest was a solvent. In the center section near the connector, the lower carrier shell between the ribs was replaced by a hatch through which a tank for toxic substances with a rigid bottom surface was inserted. This tank was bolted to the ribs, keeping the rigidity of the structure in this place. Such a decision contributed to a rapid change in the destination of the aircraft, if necessary.
The suggestion of Fishman about the location of poisonous substances in the wing caused great doubts. Here is the opinion of the engineer of the 7th department of the Air Force Research Institute Zhemchuzhina: "Further increase in the amount of loaded weight, up to the request of the Chief Chem. Managed. (4 - 5 tons) can be delivered only after testing the aircraft and determining its take off qualities with a large weight, but in any case the aircraft will require very large airfields." In addition, it was necessary to design the tanks with a spray system to develop their fastening and outflow devices. It was assumed that the height of the flight for chemical attacks would be of the order of 4000 m, but the poison would scatter over a huge area without creating dangerous concentrations. A significant portion of the drops would simply evaporate during the fall. The idea seemed completely ineffective. To compensate for this, a huge system of rapid spraying was considered. May 20 at a meeting with TsAGI chief N.M. Kharlamov, where KOSOS was represented by A.N. Tupolev and P.O. Dry, and plant number 39 - Margolin and Kolganov, discussed the plan and deadlines for the delivery of drawings for RD-BB. Responsible for the military option appointed senior engineer of the 3rd brigade KOSOS was N A. Fomin. In the summer of 1933 in TsAGI built a full-size model of a long-range bomber, approved by the commission on August 5. At the same time, working drafts of the military variant were prepared; they were completed by November 1. Initially, a prototype of DB-1 was not going to be built, considering that the difference from the record setting aircraft would be reduced mainly to the installation of weapons in the fuselage.
The VVS wanted to start the serial production of bombers right away. But after the RD-1 and RD-2 took off, numerous modifications of the design followed. Referring to this, at the end of October 1933 the head of the GUAP G.N. Korolev proposed to build a prototype of RD-VV in TsAGI. But the head of TsAGI N.M. Kharlamov categorically objected to this, stating that the changes would be minimal. On January 10, 1934, at a meeting attended by Alksnis, Kharlamovs and Tupolev, they agreed that TsAGI would make a prototype for testing on December 1, 1934. To accelerate the Moscow plant number 22 were instructed to produce for TsAGI detachable parts of the wing with tanks and some small details. On January 5, the VVS specified the basic requirements for the RD-VV flight data. The radius of action was determined as 2000 km, the maximum speed (at a flight weight of 5000 kg) - was 235 km / h, the practical ceiling (at the same weight) - at 6500 m. The landing speed should not be more than 90-110 km/h. In April 1934, TsAGI reported that the construction of a prototype was delayed due to a shortage of alloy steel pipes. Whether this aircraft actually began to be built is unknown. In August 1934, they prepared an updated task for a long-range bomber. Realizing that a slow-moving, almost incapable of maneuvering, plane with a low ceiling would be an easy prey for fighters and antiaircraft artillery, it was intended to be used only at night and in bad weather, over a terrain with a small number of landmarks or without them at all. The flight to the target was supposed to be done covertly, not in a straight line. The main purpose of the DB-1 was to bombard important political and administrative installations in the enemy's rear, as well as military factories, railway junctions, bridges, large warehouses, airfields and naval bases. A separate item mentioned "blockade of sea routes", that is, an attack on merchant ships on the high seas. The secondary function of the aircraft was the long-range reconnaissance "in the interests of the front and the main command", for which it was to be equipped with photo equipment. The new task significantly tightened the requirements for the aircraft's flight data. The landing speed was limited to 80 km/ h, and the flight range from 1000 kg of bombs was raised to 5000 km. The ANT-36 had to be kept in the air for up to 25 hours. The bomber load remained the same -1000 kg, but now it was required to hold two 500-kg bombs or four 250 kg each. Bombs of 100 kg or less were placed in the KV-2 cassette, controlled by cables and a cardan mechanism. Loading of ammunition was carried out with the help of a removable winch KD-2. They intended to use SAB-5 bombs for night bombing; four such bombs were to be carried the aircraft on the KV-1 C racks. The drop was carried out by two mechanical droppers: one was located on the left side of the commander of the aircraft, the second - on the navigator on the right. Aiming was performed by the navigator, who had an OPB-1s optical sight.
Chemical weapons, with the exception of bombs, were not mentioned in the document, but it provided for the commander's version of the DB-1, used as the group leader or long-range scout. Instead of a bomb bay, it had a radio room with a radio station for a 11KK-1 radio and a radio direction-finding device 13P. The defensive armament were going to be strengthened by installing three SHKAS machine guns with a reserve of 1500-2000 cartridges. In another document, even four machine guns were mentioned: one fixed SCAS for firing ahead (with the pilot) with ammunition of 2,000 cartridges, two for the co-pilot with 3,000 rounds plus 500 rounds in reserve, and one for the navigator for shooting down and back with 1,000 cartridges . Separate areas provide a resting place for crew members and a device for increasing buoyancy when landing on water. Part of the requirements of the new task were taken into account when constructing serial the DB-1.
Production - military DB-1 (ANT-36)
The deployment of the DB-1 was to occur when the prototypes of the ANT-25 had not yet ascended into the air. It follows from some documents that in the beginning of June 1933 after the demonstration by K.E. Voroshilov and G.K. Ordzhonikidze of the RD, right at the airport in the presence of P.I. Baranova and Ya.I. Alksnisa, who decided to build 40 copies of the machine in a military version. In the same month Tse Baranov ordered the Moscow plant number 39: "Immediately proceed to work on the serial construction of the aircraft RD in the military version. The goal was May 1934 for completion of the first 10 machines and ensure the subsequent release of 10 aircraft per month. In view of the special importance and urgency of the task, to work on the preparation of production and construction the normal scheme of mass production was abandoned. "However, the order of the assistant to the head of the GUAP Belenkovich, dated May 10, Chief of the KOSOS Tupolev and director of the plant number 39 Margolin: "Based on the orders issued to me early. GUAP Comrade Baranov - immediately proceed to the deployment of works on the RD at the plant p / y 411 in 40 - 50 examples. " P / y 411 - plant number 39. It turns out that the decision to initiate mass production took about a month earlier.
In late October, the head of the GUAP G.N. Korolev proposed to temporarily refrain from releasing RD-VV at the plant No. 39 until the completion of the development of prototypes. In addition, he believed that because of the large demands on plant No. 39 by other types of aircraft, "after determining ... physiognomy on an experimental machine", transfered the order to another enterprise. Nevertheless, from the end of November, 1933, the KOSOS began to hand over the documentation for DB-1s to the plant No. 39.28 of November 1933. By the decree of the STR, the industry undertook to manufacture 40 bombers in 1934. However, at the urging of the GUAP, the annual plan was soon reduced to 25. On January 10, 1934, at a meeting was held with the participation of Alksnis, Kharlamov and Tupolev, they agreed to build a series of RD-VV at the plant No. 124 in Kazan. Under the agreement between the VVS and the SUA, concluded on January 20, it was planned to manufacture all 25 DB-1s there. In Kazan, in March-April, all the drawings were transferred from plant No. 39. But plant No. 124 was not completed, and in early June 1934 the SUA decided to entrust the construction of 15 copies to Voronezh Plant No. 18, leaving plant No. 124 to produce a batch of ten aircraft. On the standard RD-VV, the usual M-34R engines were planned to be assembled with double-bladed wooden screws of fixed pitch, the entire lining should be smooth and riveted. In addition to wheels, a winter ski chassis was provided for. As for the bombing weapons, according to the available documents, there is no clarity, but the racks for the vertical suspension of 100-kg bombs had been ordered. The installation of the planned AFA-14 camera was envisaged. In early July, to familiarize himself with the state of preparation of the Kazan enterprise for serial production of DB-1, the head of the Logistics and Logistics Department of the Red Army Air Force, F.I. Zharov sent inspector Y.P. Yakhnevich. The conclusion turned out to be disappointing - the plant was not ready for the task and would not produce a single aircraft until the end of 1934. In July, the order of the Chief of the SUAF completely transferred serial production to plant No. 18. In early October, Voronezh was visited by the new head of the UMTS and Bazenkov. He quickly realized that production would not be completed in time. The badly needed materials (steel and aluminum pipes, forgings, castings, duralumin sheeting - even rivet). Order for the electrical equipment, which was supposed to put the plant ATE, was not at all formalized. Plant No. 22 was obliged by November 15 to hand over five sets of wings and airframes, but they had not yet been manufactured, citing the lack of necessary materials. Delayed with the production of cluster bomb racks at the plant No. 32 and screws and skis at the plant No. 28 on October 15, 1934 also contributed to delays. Chief of the UVVS Ya.I. Alksnis sent a deputy to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs Ya.B. Gamarniku memorandum "On the failure of the GUAP government task to produce 25 aircraft RD in the military version." In it, in particular, it was stated: "The situation created for the construction of an airplane in the military version ... clearly shows that without taking immediately the most decisive measures ... no aircraft RD as of 1.01.35 had been handed over the plant ... . On the execution of an order and the state of production of aircraft RD at the plant number 18 "Bazenkov suggested that by the end of the year they would not be able to release no more than one or two aircraft. But even this forecast was not justified, in 1934, not a single DB-1 was built. Meanwhile, on December 20, 1934, the STO approved the order for 1935 for 37 RD-BB aircraft, with the manufacture of two aircraft in the first quarter, ten in the second, 13 in the third, and 12 in the fourth quarter. However, in the first half of the VVS did not receive any aircraft. In July 1935 the annual order was adjusted. By the end of the year, they expected to receive 25 DB-1s, with the manufacture of seven DB-1s in the third quarter and 18 in the fourth quarter.
In October 1935, Bazenkov again visited the plant No. 18. from his presentation to Apxnis it followed that by October 29, none of the aircraft had been completed. The first production RD-VV military representative was rejected because of the insufficient strength of the center wing and a large number of production and structural defects. Nevertheless, the aircraft was flown by a factory pilot. In total, he made five flights with a total duration of just over three hours. At the same time, three mufflers broke, the oil tank cracked, and the left shock-absorber landing gear failed. After the first flights, wrinkles appeared on the skin, at first insignificant, and after the last flight - a "pronounced corrugation." The second aircraft also flew (it made one 20-minute flight), but did not receive military acceptance. In addition, the shop had five fuselages with center wing sections and installed engines. However, the gasoline, oil, and water plumbing were not completely installed, just like the flight controls and the motor. Interior equipment and coverings were partially absent. For these not unfinished aircraft there were four ready-made sets of wings, four more - without coverings and gas tanks and four on which construction was still underway. Of the four ready-made examples - the two wings were completely attached to the fuselages. There were five fuselages in construction and two more awaiting completion. There were different units for one to six machines. It was assumed that by January 1, 1936 the plant would be able to collect and fly no more than a dozen aircraft, but incomplete and "unfit" ones. There were no electric lift actuators (the ZEM plant did have four sets, but all were rejected) and there were no skis at all. Bombardment weapons were in the factories, subcontractors only were beginning assembly. The quality of the productionwas estimated as not high, although Bazenkov wrote that the last machines achieved significant improvements. The reason was the low qualification of the bulk of the workers. The latter had to master the work with a smooth sheathing, riveting and much more. It was assumed that the Voronezh plant would be helped by Plant No. 22, but the latter did not make a single example. Until the end of the first quarter of 1936, the situation with the serial production of DB-1 practically did not change. By March 1, not a single DB-1 had been delivered. On April 8, by order of the GUAP from the director of the plant No. 18 VI Chernyshov was ordered by April 12 to finish the development of the standard bomber No. 183, and to eliminate the identified defects in it and present it for military acceptance for testing. By May 1, he was ordered to put up another five examples, modeled after the aircraft number 183 noted above. During the II and III quarters of the, the plant was required to complete the remaining 20 copies of the program in 1936. By November, only seven aircraft had been delivered. But they were soon returned for repair, after the first flights the tanks were found to have cracked and there was a leak of gasoline. By that time 13DB-1s had been manufactured, two more were under construction; there was a reserve for five bombers. Head of the SUAI M.M. Kaganovich was ordered to dismantle the slipway for assembly of RD nodes and no further spare parts were to be produced. Plant No. 18 in 1935 - 1936. produced 18 copies of DB-1, which had factory numbers from 181 to 1818. Of these, 11 aircraft were handed over to the Air Force in 1936 and two in 1937.
Operational service
Initially, the RD-BB was met with high expectations. In June 1934 the Chief of Staff of the Air Force V.K. Lavrov recommended the formation of one or two squadrons of RD-BBs and to deploy them in the Far East. They could hit the most important remote targets in Japan and Korea.
However, the serial production of long-range bombers by plant No. 18 failed; of the 18 constructed, two were immediately rejected, three were left at the plant, one was sent to Leningrad and two - to the Air Force Research Institute. It is known that in 1937 military tests were conducted by the 9th long-range reconnaissance squadron of the 43rd brigade in Kharkov by Senior Lieutenant N.A. Stukalov, engineer - N.P. Kovalevsky.
Since June 26, the flight and ground crew studied the aircraft at the plant in Voronezh. The number of aircraft received and the test results are unknown, but it is unlikely that the RD-BB was highly appreciated. Low speed and low ceiling and the almost complete lack of maneuverability spoke for themselves. Plus - the need for huge airfields with good approaches, were required, and in the East there were very few of these. As a result, the 9th Squadron with ANT-6s was rearmed on the P-Zet, and not with the DB-1.
Ten (according to other sources, 11) aircraft in 1938 were briefly used by the 21st Squadron of the 11th Brigade stationed in Voronezh. At the end of the same year, ten RD-BBs were listed at the airbase in Voronezh - all faulty, and probably to be mothballed. They stood in a row on the edge of the airfield. Later they were written off and transferred to the testing range as targets for bombing and shooting.
During this period, preparations were made for a long flight on the Voroshilov (Ussuriisk)-Odessa route for a female crew consisting of M.P. Nesterenko, N.I. Rusakova and Berezhnaya. For them, they wanted to convert two DB-1s and order five motors of special assembly. To check the condition of the aircraft in Voronezh, a commission headed by PO arrived and examined bombers Nos. 1812, 1814 and 1818. Alternatively it was proposed to use the machines of the Bureau of Special Constructions. To study them in Smolensk at the plant number 35 the deputy head of the Institute of Air Force IF. Petrov arrived. In the report presented to the Deputy Chief of the Air Force Ya.V. Smush-kevic, he concluded: "For the flight to the range of the crew of Comrade Nesterenko, I consider it possible to stop on the BKK-7 aircraft. Along with the preparation for a long flight on the plane BOK-7, a female crew can set a world record for altitude. " Motivating his choice, Petrov noted that for BOC-7 the amount of preparatory work "is about half that of the RD (plant No. 18)."
However, preparations began exactly with reference to the taxiway. By September 15, 1939, the crew made 13 flights on P-5s, TB-3s and RDs, including one to Baku and back. The composition of the crew gradually changed. Gentle left and was replaced by MG. Mikhaleva. Rusakov was retrained to the navigator, but her training was too poor. As a result, M.N. Raskov replaced her.
But in 1939 the flight did not take place. In July of the following year, the crew of Nesterenko made attempts to set records on the modified DB-3 bomber, but it was unsuccessful.
By June 1941, the VVDS had only one aircraft - in NIPAV. Its’ultimate fate is unknown.
Chris
Anything related to the Harkness & Hillier monoplane?
Not related to the H&H Robert. This is the Everson Evo 2 from New Zealand. (The Evo 3 was a twin built for the big race but did not participate).
Open board!
PS: Thanks for the info Chris.
Last edited by Moses03; May 25th, 2018 at 05:40.
Hi Chris
I think we should all be indebted to you for the exhaustive info on the russian experimental planes!
Cheers
Carlo
Let's go on with this twin.
Back from hollidays I can add this to the Tupolev.Originally Posted by lefty
Google translate: "Experienced copy of RLL with Diesel engine AN-1"
_
gX
@fabulousfour: After returning from Spain I am missing tortillas, Robert. You know!
Last edited by giruXX; May 26th, 2018 at 06:05.
_
gX
Hi Uli!
Thanks so much for your continued efforts! May I just point out that according to my russian-italian dictionary the word ОПЫТНЫЙ has a double meaning: "Experienced and experimental the latter being obviously quite in line with the remaining sentence
Cheers
Carlo
So at least two people know the answer to my mystery
Originally it was planned to build a series of around 100 aircraft of this type but due to political reasons there was a shortage of important parts, so only about a dozen were built and flown.
They must have run out of tailwheels.
The missing parts were bigger and more important than an ordinary tailwheel.
Probably the manufacturer is best known for several types of license-built aircraft in the 1930ies and 40ies, although in the last decades he built several types of transport aircraft of sub-Hercules size.
Hi Robert
Is that by any chance a Tachikawa Ki54 which as you know was also used by the french in Indochina….
Cheers
Carlo
Drink too much wine, fall asleep in the sun and what do you end up with? An ..... !
Completely wrong continent, Carlo.
The plane is European from a rather warm country (not your home country, Carlo).
Thanks for your help: I got it a CASA C-201 "Alcotan"Completely wrong continent, Carlo.
The plane is European from a rather warm country (not your home country, Carlo
Cheers
Carlo
That's her, it is the prototype of the Alcotan.
Over to you, Carlo.
Thanks Robert I apologize for the delay…That's her, it is the prototype of the Alcotan.
Over to you, Carlo.
As a memento to his recent trip this is in Uli's honour…
Cheers
Carlo
https://imgur.com/a/mb4m7hi
Muchas Gracias, Carlo.
The INTA HM.7 with a small piece of fuselage-tortilla still visible behind the wing?
_
gX
Eso es amigo el turno es el tuyo ahora!Muchas Gracias, Carlo.
The INTA HM.7 with a small piece of fuselage-tortilla still visible behind the wing?
Hasta la vista
Carlo
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