Hey military dudes...I need a definition!

[Rami]

Good afternoon,

For you military dudes...would someone be able to provide me with a definition of "force survivability?"

I'm thinking Vietnam, Iraq, and a Cold War nuclear strike. We came across this in class and a student asked me what it meant.

Can you help me?

[Blackbird686]

Rami --

If that term relates to "Joint Force Survivability", then maybe this article can shed some light...

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/joint-force-survivability-hinges-on-new-jammer?a=1&c=1129

BB686:USA-flag:

[TARPSBird]

It simply means the likelihood of a military force to be able to engage in combat ops and still retain its organization and maintain its offensive and defensive capability. For example:
US Navy against Japanese Navy in night suface actions in 1942 = poor force survivability for USN.
US Navy carrier task forces against Japanese Navy in 1944/45 = good force survivability for USN.

[TeaSea]

TARPsbird has it...

Bottom Line, Force Survivability refers to the ability of any force or platform to remain mission capable after an engagement.

You will also see there are different components of Force Survivability that make up the whole; the vulnerability of the force (or platform), the susceptibility of being detected and struck, and the ability of the force or platform to recover.

This has real implications when planning any sort of offensive or defensive action. You will also see it in relation to another concept...."Force Multiplier". Certain tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), or equipment sets are known as "Force Multipliers". Force Multipliers make what would otherwise be a smaller force far more lethal and up to taking on a larger force. Despite what some may think, U.S. land forces are fairly small (usually outnumbered), but a force multiplier removes the differences quickly.

An example in ground combat operations of the use of a force multiplier would be the use of Attack Helicopters....a fantastic Force Multiplier. However, going back to your original question, the Force Survivability of an Attack Helicopter Battalion is considered to be very low (despite Hollywood's depiction of the HIND....they actually blow up real good). A planner and his commander must take both into account in determining a coarse of action.

This all sounds rather grotesque to most civilians when they hear these kinds of things, but believe me, no one forgets that the force is made of people.

In general, there are very few times when U.S. military commanders will sacrifice a force for a mission (the whole idea is to prevent yourself from ever being it that position), but it does occur.

[Rami]

Hey guys,

I appreciate the clarification. Now I can answer my student on Monday. :salute:

[SSI01]

TARPsbird has it...

Bottom Line, Force Survivability refers to the ability of any force or platform to remain mission capable after an engagement.

You will also see there are different components of Force Survivability that make up the whole; the vulnerability of the force (or platform), the susceptibility of being detected and struck, and the ability of the force or platform to recover.

This has real implications when planning any sort of offensive or defensive action. You will also see it in relation to another concept...."Force Multiplier". Certain tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), or equipment sets are known as "Force Multipliers". Force Multipliers make what would otherwise be a smaller force far more lethal and up to taking on a larger force. Despite what some may think, U.S. land forces are fairly small (usually outnumbered), but a force multiplier removes the differences quickly.

An example in ground combat operations of the use of a force multiplier would be the use of Attack Helicopters....a fantastic Force Multiplier. However, going back to your original question, the Force Survivability of an Attack Helicopter Battalion is considered to be very low (despite Hollywood's depiction of the HIND....they actually blow up real good). A planner and his commander must take both into account in determining a coarse of action.

This all sounds rather grotesque to most civilians when they hear these kinds of things, but believe me, no one forgets that the force is made of people.

In general, there are very few times when U.S. military commanders will sacrifice a force for a mission (the whole idea is to prevent yourself from ever being it that position), but it does occur.


Re: that last statement - sounds like this means one of those things like "even if we lose the whole unit, but destroy the objective, it will be worth it - shorten the war by 6 mos - etc." This was the rationale given for the August 1, 1943 ultra-low-level attack by B-24s on Ploesti, in Romania. The oil fields there were thought to be so valuable to Germany's war effort that their destruction, even if all 173 B-24s actually striking the target were lost, it would still be worth it according to the planners, including 9AF Commander LGEN Brereton. Even so, in actuality losing 1/3 of the entire force was a stunning price to pay for a relatively successful raid - so stunning, in fact, that from that date forward 9AF never again had a heavy bomber component.

Another excellent example of a force multiplier is any tanker aircraft, such as a KC-135 or KC-10, extending the range of what could otherwise be rather short-legged aircraft - and thus bringing hostile targets under attack at a much greater radius than would otherwise be possible. You could also say the Sentry AWACS is an excellent force multiplier as it allows much more precise (therefore efficient) tasking and control of airborne assets - as does the JSTARS for ground forces. Tankers/AWACS/JSTARS are VERY high-priority targets for hostile air forces or defenses, their loss will cause a significant degradation of offensive or defensive capability. I remember Tom Clancy's "Red Storm Rising" describing extremely costly, but ultimately successful, Soviet Frontal Aviation efforts to bring down an AWACS during the fictional invasion of Western Europe by WP forces, which signicantly impaired NATO's ability to deal with Soviet air and land forces in the story.

[T Square]

Rami

Everyone here is on the right track. I have heard the term used many times during Chem Warfare exercises and such. It's been a long time but I beleive it was rated during ORI's (Operational Readiness Inspections) as well as part of a units overall combat effectivness rating. For the Air Force anyway. Basicly it came down to the units ability that given the worst case scenario could you still "Turn N Burn" aircraft, provide decon, treat casualties, feed the troops etc; There were only 2 ratings Sat or Unsat. An overall unsat was bad meant you had to do it all over again, another unsat and your CO, LG/DCM and others were looking at a PCS in the near future.

[TeaSea]

Re: that last statement - sounds like this means one of those things like "even if we lose the whole unit, but destroy the objective, it will be worth it - shorten the war by 6 mos - etc." This was the rationale given for the August 1, 1943 ultra-low-level attack by B-24s on Ploesti, in Romania. The oil fields there were thought to be so valuable to Germany's war effort that their destruction, even if all 173 B-24s actually striking the target were lost, it would still be worth it according to the planners, including 9AF Commander LGEN Brereton. Even so, in actuality losing 1/3 of the entire force was a stunning price to pay for a relatively successful raid - so stunning, in fact, that from that date forward 9AF never again had a heavy bomber component.

Another excellent example of a force multiplier is any tanker aircraft, such as a KC-135 or KC-10, extending the range of what could otherwise be rather short-legged aircraft - and thus bringing hostile targets under attack at a much greater radius than would otherwise be possible. You could also say the Sentry AWACS is an excellent force multiplier as it allows much more precise (therefore efficient) tasking and control of airborne assets - as does the JSTARS for ground forces. Tankers/AWACS/JSTARS are VERY high-priority targets for hostile air forces or defenses, their loss will cause a significant degradation of offensive or defensive capability. I remember Tom Clancy's "Red Storm Rising" describing extremely costly, but ultimately successful, Soviet Frontal Aviation efforts to bring down an AWACS during the fictional invasion of Western Europe by WP forces, which signicantly impaired NATO's ability to deal with Soviet air and land forces in the story.

Actually no, regards the "even if we lose the whole unit" ... that's not what I meant. I should express myself better. Your example deals with the offense. Most instances where this has occurred is in the defense. The raid on Ploesti was an attempt to use a technique that failed. I would agree that in hindsight it was not necessarily worth the price, but hindsight is easy. Oddly enough, this same technique was key over Japan. Regardless, in both instances this is an offensive maneuver (I would point out that the USAF had an entire organization known as SAC which was dedicated to the concept of consuming itself for a particular mission).

In the Defense there are likely fewer options and my comment was really directed towards defense, an example potentially being the siege of Bastogne, where U.S. units simply ceased to exist because there was no other choice for the commander's on the ground. It was a Leonidas at Thermopylae option.

Since you mention "Red Storm Rising" ( an excellent book by the way) we can use that as an example of the same thing. Not many Americans realize that the defense of Western Europe was predicated on the consumption of the bulk of the U.S. Force in Europe (over 350,000 personnel in 1989). Had to since we were pledged to defend along the IGB (Inter-German Border) rather than develop the fight and fall back to the Rhine -- which was what made Operational and Tactical sense (trading space for time and exposing more Warsaw Pact forces to fires).



Your examples of Force Multipliers are excellent and underline why certain investments in defense technology, even though they appear to be huge sums, are important. Some things just provide a whole lot of bang for the buck.

[SSI01]

Oh, yes - "ReForGer," used to happen every year usually in the late summer. Stood for "Return of Forces to Germany." This was the "air bridge" over the Atlantic. It conveyed personnel - but not equipment - to potential combat in Europe, and was intended if ever used in earnest to bring dependents back on the return hop. I was told DoD planners just couldn't be sure the GIs in Europe would be gung-ho in taking on that Soviet juggernaut if their wives and kids were behind them under those Soviet missiles or chem-bio weapons. Yes, I remember that "forward defense" strategy, as I recall it was arrived at politically as the W. German govt insisted on it, due to popular demand. No question it would have resulted in significant losses of personnel and equipment on the NATO side, if this had come to pass, not to mention significant loss of civilian life and property damage in the FGR - much less so if space had been traded for time the way the U.S. and other allies wanted. Qualitatively good Soviet forces (GSFG) would have led the WP offensive, their not-so-hot reserve units would have come up behind to replace losses. Thus it was in NATO's best interests to chew up the leading formations quickly, as those coming up behind would have increasingly been "cannon fodder." Would have made "Forward Defense" even worse. Due to the sheer WP numbers involved, tactical nuclear weapons would definitely have been used by NATO to gum up the Soviet offensive, resulting in a like response by WP. Their doctrine called for the use early on of chem-bio weapons on NATO HQ, supply dumps and assembly areas, plus air bases. The scale and pace of the destruction involved here would have been beyond belief. Auf Wiedersehn, Deutschland!

If there is anything at all humorous coming out of this, it would have to be the idea of Soviet units and commanders constantly looking over their shoulders wondering if their WP "allies" would be willing to passively take NATO tactical nuke strikes "for the team." NATO was an alliance of the willing; that can't be said for the WP, and you have to wonder just how long it would have held together before the damage done by NATO in Poland, Lithuania, E. Germany, Hungary, and elsewhere would have units from those countries refusing to obey Soviet orders, and pursuing national interests on their own - in other words, turning East rather than West.

U.S. 7th Army in W. Germany was a good force. I have been told by more than one person who should know that qualitatively speaking, the best troops on both sides were the Germans, E. or W. The Americans and Brits were tied for 2nd, in NATO. In the WP, after the E. Germans, came the Poles, and we all know how they could behave under circumstances like this. I can say this, as I have Pole in me and know their attitudes toward their neighbors. Entertaining, to say the least. I wonder how many late-night worry sessions there were in the Kremlin about this tendency?

Good reply! Love these intellectual exercises and historical "what-if" ing!

P.S. Does Bataan/Corregidor qualify under your "defense" scenario? I am wondering about this. It wasn't voluntary - circumstance resulted in the isolation and destruction of the U.S. units.

[T Square]

SSI01

My first PCS base was Kinckloe AFB Mich. in 1975, working on B-52H and AGM69A SRAM Missiles. Those were some crazy years. A couple of things really standout in my mind about those times. One was the Forced Generation Exercises Load all the 52,s download them and then launch them all. If you have ever imagined 25 B-52s and 25 KC-135s taking off one after the other every 15 minutes, just the noise was incredable. The fact that if all those aircraft made it to thier targets at least a quarter of the earth would have been gone seemed to get lost in the moment. As a lowly A1C I asked my Chief what happens after this, his reply surprised me "We become infantry". We were briefed that our families would be assembled and moved to the shelter of the Edison Sault Electric Plant in Sault Sainte Maire, again why go there? The plant is located on the Soo locks and supplies power to about 50,000 customers or more, I mean if I were a pissed off Russian I might want to Nuc that just for spite. When you start talking about what if scenarios, I always wind up asking myself the same question. At what point would you say hey you win don't squeze that trigger it's all yours, so now what ! Reality is if we all were like that Chinese Gentleman who stood in front of the tank in the square a few years ago could you run us all over. I Know I couldn't do it.

[TeaSea]

Good reply! Love these intellectual exercises and historical "what-if" ing!

P.S. Does Bataan/Corregidor qualify under your "defense" scenario? I am wondering about this. It wasn't voluntary - circumstance resulted in the isolation and destruction of the U.S. units.

Oh yeah....we can go on forever....:wavey:

I personally would not say the defense of the Bataan as fitting fit in this category as the only "mission" was one of slowing down the Japanese. Once it was clear the U.S. was not to launch a relief effort, the end was pretty much understood. At some point even attriting the Japanese failed to make much sense. In a way, allowing the Japanese to garrison the Philippines and therefore extending their internal LOC's actually contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Japanese, although I'm sure the Philippine's didn't care for that too much. So, I would tend to think that at some point Wainwright accepted that his job was now simply to keep as many American's and Filipino troops alive as possible. I do not know if he would have made the same decisions given subsequent events but there's that hindsight thing again.

Rami's probably sorry he asked....:icon_lol:

This is what you get with a Forum with a lot History nuts.

[SSI01]

Bataan and Corregidor have a peculiar fascination for me as that was the last stand of the "old" U.S. Army, Sgt York's Army. Dad had been in since January 1941 which in his view made him a professional. As you may know there was a big push in early 1941 to send as many spare U.S. units to the PI as possible, I think a MN tank unit went as well as some CA NG units. His unit of the Coast Artillery Corps was culled to send experienced men to Corregidor and the other fortified islands in Manila Bay. When the rumble started he and his friends would listen to the radio broadcasts from KCBS in San Francisco about the latest events in the PI, wondering about the guys they knew who were there. What they did on The Rock, and their infantry bretheren on Bataan, was done under orders, of course, but also for pride in "their" Army, as they knew it. They set a timeless standard, but suffered heavily for it. MacArthur made a strategic error by making Wainwright commander of all U.S. troops in the PI after Mac left. When Wainwright signed the surrender instrument with Homma, he therefore surrendered all U.S. units in the islands. It would have been better to make him just commander of U.S. units on Luzon. Thus Gen King farther south, and local commanders, could have exercised better control over a guerrilla campaign and not given the Japanese legal standing to treat captured U.S. irregulars as war criminals and executed them - as they were technically disobeying the orders of their CO by offering further resistance in the hills.

P.S. You're right re: poor Rami - but you know something - maybe discussing this where he can see it, and maybe impart some of it somehow to his young people, will make up for the lack of its telling in their textbooks nowadays.

[TeaSea]

We call that the "brown shoe" army...the army of James Jones and "From Here To Eternity".

[SSI01]

I always watch that film when it comes on TCM or any other network. When I was stationed at NAVSTA Pearl Harbor I had many occasions to visit Schofield Barracks, and I visited the "quad" where that film was made - it's a local legend. I was also at the spot where the corporal who took Montgomery Clift for his little stroll up in the mountains stops for a while, gets off his bike and offers Monty a smoke - it's at the high point in the pass between the western end of Schofield Bks and the naval magazine at Lualualei - the rock in the movie background is readily recognizable when you're there. There is a spectacular view of the leeward shore only a few paces from where the actors are conversing, but you never see it. Dad never said anything about NCOs in his battery being chosen based on their boxing prowess - however, First Sgt got everyone's attention when they were lined up to meet him for the first time. He walked out of the HQ building toward them, but there was an iron wheelbarrow in the way. Top just picked it up over his head and threw it 10 or 12 feet away from him, then continued over to them. He had their undivided attention from then on!:icon_eek:

[SSI01]

T Square - forgive me for not replying sooner. Good to hear from a brother Airman! You know, I was told essentially the same thing by people who had been on SAC bases INCONUS - once the bombers were launched, it was basically "find a good spot and hunker down, with your family if you've got one!" The nickname for SAC bomber bases was "The First Goodbye." All my experience was in TAC, so our doctrine was a little different - it was high aircraft turnaround rates no matter what. I can remember only one mass launch, at Luke AFB, AZ probably in 1975 when we got over 60 F-4s into the air in one long procession. The din was deafening. Nonetheless, the pressure was always on to get servicing done quickly and right the first time. Little things can make a big impression. For me one of them was the first time I saw "Dr. Strangelove." Getting past the comedic aspects of the film, watching the bomber crew going through their settings prior to commencing their bomb run made a terrific impression on this 10-year-old. Everything I saw implied mastery of their craft, and discipline - there was also the knowledge these men were holding hell, death and damnation in their hands for most of the human race, with all the responsibility that went with it. Say what you want about Gen LeMay and the instrument he forged out of SAC - but for the command's entire existence, there was no major global war, so the nuclear deterrent must have worked. I spent 23 years in Fed law enforcement and 4 in the USAF and still consider the Air Force the high point of my Federal service. No one can ever take that from you, no matter what! :salute:

[T Square]

SSI01

My experience was in SAC, ADC, TAC, and ANG. The biggest differnce between SAC and TAC ORI's was that SAC when you launched those bombers the exercise was pretty much done, it was recover and beers at the NCO club. In TAC after you had that initial flush, then came ICTs. I loved those ICT's that's what it was all about "Turn N Burn". I spent 30 years in weapons from storage and maintenance to weapons loading conventional and nuclear, B-52s, F-101s, F-4s, F-16s. There is one thing that I am absolutly sure of: The most devestating weapon system I ever worked on was the B-52, a common load of 4 MK.28s and 20 AGM-69A equaled over 10 megatons, at 25 aircraft per base roughly 12 bases (at least 2 of which were double wings of 50), do the math. If even a quarter get through, this big blue marble will turn to burnt brown in a matter of hours. There is no such thing as a limited nuclear strike, I remember fallout exercises at Ellington Field in Houston Texas, we used our maintenance hangar as a shelter, what a joke! Like we were just going to get fallout in Houston. We all pretty much agreed if this was the real thing, everything gets launched FMC or not. Then we were going to have the biggest Barbeque you ever saw, all the beer you could drink, just waitn' for the charcol to light-up. People either love it or hate it but "Doctor Strangelove" had some truth in it.

[pfflyers]

When I was stationed in Germany in the seventies, guarding my little piece of the Czech border, it was conventional wisdom that we were just a speedbump to the WP forces. We figured we were really just a tripwire, when the Soviets punched through us the nukes would start flying.

[SSI01]

Ever hear of the "Fulda Gap"?

[wombat666]

Late to the party as usual!
In very simple terms, the basic 'Force Multipliers' in small unit ops are training/teamwork/morale.
Bottom of the Food Chain 'stuff' but it goes to the core of how effective any unit operates.
:kilroy:

[SSI01]

I can tell you with absolute certainty a good cook is a very valuable commodity that unit commanders or ship captains will go to war over. If he can keep the troops happy, morale soars, efficiency increases and you've got happy people doing what would otherwise be rather tedious or even dangerous jobs quite well. A good example of this are the messing arrangements in U.S. submarines. In that respect you could call this individual a force multiplier, I suppose.

[T Square]

Another "force multiplier" is a good scronger. If you had a good scronger in your section you were truly blessed. A good scronger could not only deliver the goods, but do it without getting caught. I think a the number one quality in a scronger is imagination, he sees things in a way normal people don't. We had this one guy in an ANG unit I was with, the unit was on a closed Air Force Base, all the buildings were still there waiting to be destroyed. The city where the base was located was taking over leaving just the ANG property. Well one day he was late for work said he had to make a stop, and it took a little long than expected. The next day same thing, also noticed that a parts room in our maintenance bay was filling up with a lot of junk. Asked this guy what was going on, he says couple of days it'll be gone. Couple of days later, gives me a key and asks if I will take control of the new locker in the breakroom, show me what it is first, sure. He had noticed that the old base NCO club was being demmo'd so he liberated some things he thought might improve morale. Open this cabinet and we got a refrigerated keg with tap, strictly for off duty morale, with the key under my control. Next to it is a cabinet with a soft serve ice cream machine, I've got a buddy in the chowhall who will supply us with the ice cream mix once a month on UTAs, all from the equipment came from the now gone NCO Club didn't cost a dime just needed to be cleaned up, along with a popcorn machine. The ice cream was a God send during Chem exercises in full MOP in August in Texas. Guy deserved a Medal of Honor. Once we needed a new refrigerator for the breakroom, next day there it was, the damn thing was full of medical specimens, and still cold, I don't want to know. What a guy !

[SSI01]

Someone who knows "the book" but hasn't had their brain corrupted by "the book" is an extremely valuable commodity as well. They know the system and how to manipulate it to the good of all.

This is where a good admin troop, especially one with seniority, can be extremely handy.:wiggle: