PRB
October 8th, 2011, 15:30
Reading The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, by James D. Hornfischer. It's primarily about the DDs and DEs of “Taffy 3” off Samar on October 25, 1944 when they stood against the battlewagons and heavy cruisers of the Nihon Kaigun.
One of the more striking aspects of this book, to me, was the picture Hornfischer paints of the CO of the destroyer Johnston, Cdr. Ernest E. Evans. I'm not sure if he meant to paint such as picture, or if it was just me. When Kurita's “Center Force” came upon the hapless Taffy 3, Evans, without consulting the screening force commander, nor the task force commander, nor anyone at all, and without delay, took his ship out of formation and charged the Japanese fleet alone. Hornfischer places this action in the context of Evan's speech when he took command of the Johnston, in which he told his crew that he intended to take his ship into harm's way, and anyone who didn't want to do that should get off now. The picture he paints is of a brave and courageous, but unthinking, man. Such a picture is interesting in an account of the Battle of Leyte Gulf because one could argue that Taffy 3 was placed into the predicament they found themselves because of another rash and unthinking fighter in charge of Task Force 38, Bill Halsey, who was effectively lured away from San Bernadino Straight because of the same “personality traits”... Hornfischer doesn't make that connection in the book, but it's why I found it interesting.
It's an excellent book, no question. He spends a lot of pages teaching us of the crew of the DE Samuel B. Roberts, as that heroic little ship joined the Fletcher class DDs Hoel and Heermann as they made a coordinated (sort of) torpedo attack against the IJN heavies. The difference between Captain Copeland of the “Sammy B” and Captain Evans of the Johnston was that while Copeland joined the DDs against orders from Taffy 3 CO, Admiral Sprague, who wanted the DEs to mount their own separate attack, due to their lesser speed, Copeland's decision was made after quickly and correctly evaluating the tactical situation, factors of which included the DDs were slowed while crossing the CV formation, and avoiding collisions, and the other DEs were on the other side of the CVE formation.
It's an amazing story of unbelievable courage in the face of certain death. One of the most heroic “last stands” in US Naval history. Well worth the read.
http://www.prbsystems.com/pics/TinCans.jpg
One of the more striking aspects of this book, to me, was the picture Hornfischer paints of the CO of the destroyer Johnston, Cdr. Ernest E. Evans. I'm not sure if he meant to paint such as picture, or if it was just me. When Kurita's “Center Force” came upon the hapless Taffy 3, Evans, without consulting the screening force commander, nor the task force commander, nor anyone at all, and without delay, took his ship out of formation and charged the Japanese fleet alone. Hornfischer places this action in the context of Evan's speech when he took command of the Johnston, in which he told his crew that he intended to take his ship into harm's way, and anyone who didn't want to do that should get off now. The picture he paints is of a brave and courageous, but unthinking, man. Such a picture is interesting in an account of the Battle of Leyte Gulf because one could argue that Taffy 3 was placed into the predicament they found themselves because of another rash and unthinking fighter in charge of Task Force 38, Bill Halsey, who was effectively lured away from San Bernadino Straight because of the same “personality traits”... Hornfischer doesn't make that connection in the book, but it's why I found it interesting.
It's an excellent book, no question. He spends a lot of pages teaching us of the crew of the DE Samuel B. Roberts, as that heroic little ship joined the Fletcher class DDs Hoel and Heermann as they made a coordinated (sort of) torpedo attack against the IJN heavies. The difference between Captain Copeland of the “Sammy B” and Captain Evans of the Johnston was that while Copeland joined the DDs against orders from Taffy 3 CO, Admiral Sprague, who wanted the DEs to mount their own separate attack, due to their lesser speed, Copeland's decision was made after quickly and correctly evaluating the tactical situation, factors of which included the DDs were slowed while crossing the CV formation, and avoiding collisions, and the other DEs were on the other side of the CVE formation.
It's an amazing story of unbelievable courage in the face of certain death. One of the most heroic “last stands” in US Naval history. Well worth the read.
http://www.prbsystems.com/pics/TinCans.jpg